Syrians in Exile: Challenges of Building a Diaspora Community in Germany

Dream of City through the Eye of Women (© Gulnar Hajo)

Introduction

The Syrian diaspora community has existed for decades around the world, through individuals who wished to migrate for work or academic achievement, and they were able to integrate very well on the social, cultural, and political levels and achieved many success stories in their host societies and were able to form Syrian diaspora communities around the world.

However, in 2012, a year after the start of the Syrian revolution, Syrians began their journey in the diaspora in a different way. They began a refugee journey around the world to escape persecution, arrest, and death, as millions of them sought refuge in different countries, including border countries for Syria such as Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey, and Iraq. Some preferred to endure the hardships of traveling and going further, as thousands of them arrived in the European Union, North and South America. Germany witnessed the most significant refugee wave in 2015. And many Syrians around the world today hold the status of humanitarian or political refugees in the EU or Turkey or Lebanon or other countries and many Syrians have obtained the citizenship of the country in which they have sought refuge.

Some newcomers in Germany have been able to learn the language, find a suitable job or resume their studies and overcome various daily difficulties related to basic needs for communication, financial support, or academic qualification. However, many of them also face various challenges related to integration due to cultural differences or language challenges. In addition, the Syrians face different challenges together in building a unified? Syrian diaspora community. These challenges lie in the existence of a new Syrian diaspora community made up of refugees who were forced by the war to be in Germany and had not intended to immigrate to Germany previously, and an old Syrian diaspora community made up of immigrants (the Syrians who came before the Syrian revolution). The challenges are also through direct and indirect communication with each other as Syrian, as Syrian newcomers to other Syrian newcomers or as Syrian newcomers to former Syrian immigrants. There are a lot of intersections, compatibilities, and similarities in terms of culture, language or religion, but the presence of some important factors such as (identity conflict and belonging, length of residence and integration with the host society, individual successes, and economic relations, challenges experienced by immigrants previously) has contributed to the lack of shared ground so far.

This year is my ninth year away from Syria, and I hold refugee status and am still looking for a new homeland, and a society that I can belong to and that helps me find peace, freedom, justice and feeling as a citizen who enjoys rights, and duties, and has freedom of expression, demonstration, protest and belonging to a homeland. I lived twenty years in Syria. I was forced to leave it, like hundreds of thousands of Syrian youth, for fear of being involved in the conflict, or being a killer or killed. I chose to study political science because I could not abandon Syria or the idea of ​​contributing to building peace for the Syrians themselves and for the sake of the Syrians and their future. I have been living in Germany since 2015 and I understand the necessity of forming the Syrian diaspora community, but I also see the challenges and difficulties facing the Syrian diaspora community to show its true influence and formation.

I seek through this paper to contribute to the studies of the Syrian diaspora, and to discuss the questions, ideas, challenges , and experiences that the Syrian diaspora community possesses, and the way towards forming a single Syrian diaspora community in the city of Berlin, and to provide a background on the Syrians, and the Syrian diaspora community, and the role The political and economic he plays in German politics and the discussion of whether it is time to work on the formation of this society? As for the Syrians need more time, support and experience to build the diaspora community again?

This paper includes excerpts from two online interviews I conducted with two young men from Syria: Samer, 33 years old, from Suwayda, Syria, studied for a master’s degree in economics in Berlin, works as an accountant in a German company, is married and has been living in Germany since 2015.

Amjad, 33 years old, from Damascus, Syria, is a communications engineer, works for a global technology company in Berlin, is married, and has been living in Berlin since 2015.

Background

The Syrian Revolution

Eleven years ago a popular revolution in Syria that was not completed, or is not intended to be completed, began against the Assad regime, which has been ruling the country for more than 50 years amid numerous international interventions. This ruling regime appears to be insatiable with the blood of its people. The Syrian regime countered the Syrian revolution with a military solution and turned the country into a battlefield on which hundreds of thousands of civilians were killed. The regime was responsible for most of the killings. According to the Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR) reports over the past ten years, the regime committed the most heinous crimes, including the bombing of its people with chemical weapons(1).

The revolution against the Syrian regime began in mid-March 2011 with demonstrations in Daraa; the Syrian people protested against the arrest of children by the security forces, children who had written anti-regime slogans and slogans against its president. On the 15th of the same month, protests in Damascus calling for reform and freedom. After that, the demonstrations extended to the rest of the Syrian governorates and turned from demonstrations calling for reform, to demonstrations calling for the overthrow of a regime that confronted them with violence and murder.

With the regime intensifying into a military solution and confronting the demonstrators with fire, the revolution took a military turn. Clashes began between the regime forces and the armed opposition forces, which joined together under the name “Free Syrian Army,” in early 2012, more than nine months after the start of peaceful demonstrations, in response to Assad’s use of a brutal killing machine against protesting civilians. Several reports during the past years indicated that the regime and its allies (Russia, Iran, and its militias) committed war crimes, including the use of chemical weapons, the policy of starvation, forced displacement, siege, arbitrary detention, and torture, in addition to the systematic and deliberate killing of hundreds of thousands of civilians(2).

About 400,000 people died, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights(3), which continues to calculate the number of deaths after international organizations stopped doing so long ago. The bloody conflict forced half of Syria’s population of nearly 22 million to leave their homes, in the largest wave of displacement since World War II.

And more than six and a half million Syrians left the country, most of them to neighbouring countries, especially Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan. Almost a third of them were children aged 11 and below, according to statistics from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. And displaced inside the country were more than six million people(4).

Turkey hosts the largest portion of registered Syrian refugees, amounting to three million and six hundred thousand Syrians, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. While the German DeZim Institute stated(5) it is “realistic” to consider that the number of refugees is close to 3.7 million Syrians.

More than a million refugees have taken refuge in Lebanon, according to UN estimates, while the UNHCR in Lebanon(6) says that the “actual” number is more than a million and a half. About 663,000 Syrian refugees registered with the United Nations live in Jordan, while the Jordanian government estimates the number of Syrians who have sought refuge in the Kingdom of Jordan since the outbreak of the conflict in Syria at more than one million. And 246,000 Syrian refugees live in Iraq, most of them in Kurdistan.

In Egypt, about 130,000 refugees registered with the United Nations live, and at least 100,000 have arrived in Sweden. As for Germany, in June of 2020, the UNHCR(7) reported that there were 662,000 Syrians at the end of 2020 after only 30,000 Syrians lived in Germany before the war(8).

I try through this paper to discuss questions and ideas about social issues related to integration and communication issues between Syrians and the German society and between Syrians among themselves in Germany, and I try to discuss the way towards forming a Syrian diaspora community in the city of Berlin. I will focus on the Syrian community residing in Germany and I will be providing a background on the Syrian diaspora community in general.

Research methods

While working on this paper, the necessary data was collected through semi-structured interviews in Arabic, held online via videoconferencing, which were recorded and then analyzed, with persons from Syria who have a background of asylum and different degrees of integration, and the aim was to benefit from their different experiences and obtain entries to the reality of Syrian society in Berlin. In addition to these interviews, various literary and academic sources were used, including literature by Syrian researchers and academics, and researchers with interests in asylum, integration, immigration and diaspora communities.

Two young men from Syria, residing in Berlin, were interviewed. Samer, 33, from As-Suwayda, Syria, studied a master’s degree in economics in Berlin, works as an accountant in a German company, is married and has been living in Germany since 2015. I met Samer in Berlin and we share our interest in the Syrian issue and Syrian refugees. Samer’s participation in the interview was important because of his great civil and political activity in Germany, which helped me collect valuable data that intersects with the activity of the Syrian community.

Amjad, 33 years old, from Damascus, Syria, a communications engineer, works for a global technology company in Berlin, he is married and has lived in Berlin since 2015. He also is a musician and organizes a lot of concerts and events, and I have a lot of access to Syrian youth in Berlin, also because of his activity in music which gives him access to different segments of German society. He has an interest in helping refugees, I got to know Amjad through his work with refugees in providing them with educational opportunities in the field of technology in Berlin.

In order to try to understand the challenges that stand before the formation of a diaspora community, it is very important to talk about the concept of the community in its general form and in its particular form for the Syrians, and I present here the following.

The concept of community

The concept of community has been defined in Albert Hunter’s book “Conceptualizing Community” where he introduces the concept of community through the simple but powerful idea that community is both an object, a thing, a unit of social organization, and also a quality, a variable. The framework advanced here sees the concept of community as a multi-dimensional variable where each dimension may vary by degree.

The “ ideal type” society framework of Hunter consists of the three distinct dimensions defined as ecological (space, time), social structural (networks of institutions and interaction), and symbolic cultural (identity, norms and values). These multiple dimensions of the community suggest the community has “fractured” into various real-world forms and also varied conceptual meanings. Not only are these three dimensions theoretically informed and elaborated with much empirical research, but they are also a heuristic device, a useful tool, for guiding both policy agendas and research questions focused on local communities.

During the interviews, both Samer and Amjad presented a similar concept about the definition of a community, as Samer and Amjad see that a community is a civil institutional body of a cultural group (minority), which contributes to building political, economic, cultural and religious communication between this group and the German federal and local government. This body constitutes the official channel through which official support by the German authorities can reach as many sides as possible, and work at the political, social, cultural and religious levels in the bureaucracy. The existence of such a body contributes to the integration and mutual dialogue between the community and the German society and can show the diversity that exists in this society.

And here, when we say local governments or federations, we do not mean, of course, a single central body as much as we are referring to the complex cultural, social, and political institutions that, in their aggregate, represent the administrative apparatus of these federations and through which the state interacts with the institutions of cultural minorities or all institutions civil society more generally.

At this point we can look at the importance of this institutional body and its interactive role in German society when it fulfills its concepts and the conditions that must be achieved to enable the capabilities and energies of the group and individuals belonging to it and to benefit at the same time with the support of the German federal state and to the extent that allows it to rise and practice creative interaction within German society.

Community as a Syrian concept

It is very important, at the outset, to say that this vision is based mainly on observation, and the current practical practice of criticizing the Syrian reality, due to the weakness or absence of written references in this regard.

Based on observation and the tangible effects of the practice of the Syrian community in its various organizational frameworks, it can be said that the concept of the community in the Syrian mentality did not differ much from the concept of a family gathering, a youth gathering or an association, as embodied by Syrian gatherings since the seventies of the last century. These concepts, as we will see, are very narrow and deviate further from the desired goal of community as an institutional body.

The concept of family gathering, youth gathering, or association — in my estimation — is this spontaneous act that is based mainly on the network of social relations, in organizing social events, celebrations or religious events, which are part of the predominant culture of the Syrians. This may include more sophisticated actions such as establishing a sports team or attempts to establish classrooms to teach Arabic and religion, or even organizing an event with multiple programs and goals, without prejudice to the general context of spontaneity and improvisation. And when I stress here terms such as “spontaneous”, “improvisation” or “attempts”, they only indicate the limitations of thought and practices that govern these projects and reduce their usefulness.

This failure may be attributed to achieving the goals of the community as a modern institutional framework due to structural problems in the context of our identity and our background as Syrian society, tribalism, ethnicity and the phenomenon in our most modern organizational frameworks, and I mean here civil society institutions and modern Syrian organizations. In our current case, this can be proven with the least possible effort when we refer to the division of the Syrian communities into small subunits, each of which represents a tribal or ethnic group.

Where we can clearly find a community based on a geographical basis, such as the Syrian community of individuals from the city of Homs and the Syrian community of individuals from the city of Aleppo in the city of Berlin, for example. It is important to point out here that these metaphorical divisions are more illusory than an expression of a self-image. Because the witness is that these communities, despite their geographical divisions, nonetheless suffer deeper internal divisions, making each one of them carry within its hollow sub-communities that are superior to each other by ethnic, class or even religious distinction. The funny thing is that each of these communities claims to have the exclusive right to the concept of Syria, which really reminds us of the concept of the surviving group in the literature of religious sects. It is important here to emphasize that all these divisions and fragmentations are not necessarily governed by intellectual or conceptual differences or even deep ideological divisions as much as they are often artificially arbitrary differences behind an inherited history of personal aspirations of a highly individual character that are not satisfied or reinforced by specific capabilities or even life experiences which would give it a measure of reasonableness.

The Syrian diaspora community

The conflict in Syria over the past years has caused a forcible movement of more than half of the population, some of whom have fled within the country, while millions have fled outside, which has caused the most serious global refugee crisis since World War II. About 18 million Syrians have been living outside Syria for years and decades. According to Bassma Kodman(9)i, these Syrians have migrated in successive waves and settled in about 30 different countries around the world, all the way to South America and the Caribbean islands. Thousands of Syrians joined these as a result of the conflict that began in 2011. The number of Syrians outside Syria is now three times as many as those living inside. And this is not only for the Syrians, but also the number of Lebanese refugees and immigrants and Palestinian immigrants and refugees scattered across the continents which is also three to four times higher than the number of those in Lebanon and Palestine. However, the Syrian conflict and all its challenges, tragedy, migration, displacement, and the need for asylum for civilians have undoubtedly led to a new realization of the existence of a large and new Syrian diaspora community, which is trying to impose itself after more than 11 years of conflict.

Before the beginning of the conflict, Syria was suffering from the problem of emigration of academics and professionals, including engineers and doctors. According to Bassma Kodmani(10), more than 6,000 doctors settled in France, and more than 20,000 doctors settled in the United States of America(11). Most Syrians who had established themselves abroad for years or decades had maintained strong ties with Syria, wherein 2010, remittances from the Syrian diaspora community to Syria were estimated at more than $2 billion, roughly 3.5 percent of GDP. total for Syria. These contributions were made by diaspora communities in Germany, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United States(12).

In 2014, remittances from Europe alone to Syria amounted to 84 million dollars, and this number is growing every year due to the contribution of new Syrian refugees(13).

Over the past 11 years since the start of the conflict, the Syrian diaspora communities in different parts of the world have been communicating with each other as well as with the Syrians at home, after showing keen interest in what was happening in Syria and taking positions between opponents and supporters of the regime. These communities constituted a major source of support for Syria This was the most important test of the connection of the Syrian diaspora communities to the motherland, Syria, during the last period.

The Syrian diaspora communities during the past years of conflict have shown strength, flexibility and initiative in material support, fundraising, financing and humanitarian response within Syria or in refugee camps in Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey, as well as at the political level through organizing advocacy and awareness campaigns about what is happening in Syria.

It can be expected that the diaspora community will be highly influential, and have an important role in the process of rebuilding Syria, but the challenge here lies in organizing the Syrian diaspora community at an institutional level that contributes to showing its work and participation in the future of Syria. t has become globally known the volume of investment and development which is provided through diaspora societies in different countries and societies, in addition to their role in establishing international relations, planning and studies, and facilitating the participation of the international community in development and re-business in countries that have suffered from conflicts and wars.

In addition to these contributions,one needs to consider the impact on social dynamics and the delivery of civic knowledge of human rights and teachings of citizenship and building political awareness, and providing educational opportunities, scholarships and training using modern means of communication.

The new Syrian diaspora groups have acquired skills, experience, and resources that have enabled them to succeed in their host countries. And the new Syrian diaspora groups were able to build a single affiliation to one Syria as a whole, and thousands of new young Syrians join these groups, who had different ideas and experiences and a great connection to Syria, the homeland. These skills will contribute to building the financial, human, and intellectual mobilization to build a stronger diaspora society. The diaspora organizations that were founded and managed by many refugees or migrants have been able to gain a lot of knowledge, experience, and familiarity with the techniques and processes that Syrians need in Syria. They have also contributed by finding the following mechanism that enables Syrian diaspora members to contribute to Syria through donations or mentorship and to share the skills they have acquired in their host communities

The Syrian diaspora communities are now trying to discover their true role and size and are working to organize themselves clearly and consciously, to become a strategic partner that the international community, including international organizations or Western governments, can support Syria in the process of peacebuilding and reconstruction. And it can contribute to ensuring the independence and strengthening the legitimacy of Syrian civil society organizations by helping them reduce dependence on foreign funding and finding a mechanism that can agree to work between foreign financial support according to a Syrian work schedule.

The Syrian diaspora communities are today considered a major contributor to supporting the Syrian peace process, directly or indirectly, and are trying to find a space for them in the corridors of international decision-making at the political level, such as the The Civil Society Support Room (CSSR)(14), which includes many immigrant personalities in Europe, USA or other countries. The Arab League and the organization and contract of international companies have a significant impact on the shape and future of the Syrian political reality. The Syrian diaspora communities possessed a set of characteristics and relationships that contributed to building a soft pressure policy and influencing different policies to provide support to Syria in different, more effective ways, and to develop cooperative initiatives with a common impact. As an example here, I mention Verband Deutsch-Syrischer Hilfsvereine(15) in Germany, which is the strategic partner for communication between The Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit and Syrian organizations working to support Syrians from Germany.

Berlin the capital of exile

“These streets lose themselves in infinity … a countless human crowd moves in them, constantly new people with unknown aims that intersect like the linear maze of a pattern sheet.” — Siegfried Kracauer in Berlin, “Screams on the Street” (1930).

Berlin is the city of the new exile, the capital that embraces many immigrants, refugees and intellectuals, Syrians, Palestinians, Lebanese, Turks and Brazilians, a city that shows a unique diversity, a city that speaks different languages, building on multiple cultures from arts to food to music.

Berlin is a city that offers the opportunity for new beginnings,for people who have left because of political challenges and regional conflicts, and has provided a safe haven for tens of thousands of refugees and intellectuals, from all the revolutions witnessed in the Arab world in 2011, pushing thousands of people to search for a new world, a unique and different exile, providing care for the civic, intellectual and political activist. Berlin offers a favorable environment to embrace an intellectual and political community of victims of political domination in the Arab world. This, for example, was what New York was for Jewish thinkers after the thirties fleeing Europe, and what Paris became for Latin American intellectuals fleeing their countries`dictatorships in the seventies and eighties(16).

With the many opportunities and challenges that Berlin offers to individuals and groups from the Arab world, especially Syrians, Syrians today, with their constantly increasing number, need to create a community that has a clear name, shape and adjective that helps them understand themselves better and focus strategically in the long term. And it establishes the formation of a cultural, intellectual and political community, connected with the Syrians in Syria and capable of enabling the Syrians in Syria to reform and support political and intellectual activity and to deliver what the West offers in terms of building the state, respecting human rights and understanding the social contract in relation to the Syrian society in Syria.

“Syrians today need to be together, they must unite and meet in an organized manner to find the real space in this society, they must be able to build a body capable of representing them politically and socially, they must find the channel that can facilitate their integration and dialogue and protect them from any policies against immigrants,”(17) Amjad says.

In 2015, with the largest refugee wave, which included more than 40,000 Syrians living today in Berlin, Berlin welcomed many academics, writers, poets, playwrights, engineers, doctors and students. Artists and activists, among others, from Syria, Egypt, Tunisia and Lebanon were drawn towards Berlin sanctuary and refuge. The unique Arab environment that was formed in new geographic, social and cultural conditions arose in Berlin and necessitates rebuilding visions and practices about this environment, its role and its policies. This environment arose from victims and exiles from a world devastated by wars, government policies, terrorism, political failure, doctorates, coups in all its forms, and a global struggle for power. This environment was tested with the revolutions of 2011 of courage and resistance. It experienced various forms of violence and state terrorism, from the security grip, arrests, and sanctification of freedom. This environment gained political awareness and acquired a new personality that it presented as a revolutionary who refused to bow.

This environment has received a lot of German interest, from civil society, universities, political parties, cultural centers and local initiatives to support newcomers to find a safe place for them in the capital, but there has always been something to disturb this interest, with the political crowd supported by AFD and rejecting this new society, racism and the demand for the deportation of refugees and the constant attempt to show or fabricate crimes and attitudes related to the new arrivals. A rejection of the presence of refugees in German society, began to appear. And these experiences put the refugees on various troubles, not to mention all the strikes that the newcomers suffer because of loneliness and moving to a new place and the difficulty of integration, the language and the responsibilities that link them to Syria or their countries of origin, and also to stand up to this racism.

The newly arrived Syrians in Berlin tried to find a common space with the old communities, a place that would provide them with meeting, food and exchange today, and put them in direct contact with the Arab community in Berlin. Sonnenallee or the so called Arab Street can tell about the history of the Arab presence in the city. Formerly Sonnenallee was a “little Beirut” with its Lebanese shops, today it has turned into a new Syrian neighbourhood in the diaspora, but this transformation does not hide the clash between new and old arrivals.

During the Cold War, the Sonnenallee was not particularly noticeable except for a checkpoint that only attracted attention on Easter Sunday when many West Berliners were visiting relatives in the East. The street, which was called “Little Beirut”(18), was famous for its Lebanese shops and smoky cafés, with the sound of old Arabic songs infiltrating. Then in 2015 the street came to life again. A large influx of Syrians has turned the Sonnen Allee into one of the busiest streets in the capital, Berlin. Today, crowds of shoppers pass by the stalls that sell vegetables and fruits.

An Arab community has lived in Berlin since 1960, when West Germany invited thousands of Moroccans and Tunesians to be “guest workers” to help the striving economy. In the eighties and early nineties of the last century, tens of thousands of Lebanese and Lebanese immigrants of Palestinian origin arrived after fleeing the civil war in Lebanon. Most of them live in parallel societies and these Arab immigrants rarely integrate with their German neighbors. Government data indicates that unemployment rates are high among men, while a third of women live on social benefits According to DW(19).

“Previous generations of Arab immigrants in places like Sonnenallee are usually more resentful of the newcomers than Germans(20),” Samer says.

Of the thousands of migrants who applied for asylum in Germany in 2015, more than 62 percent obtained refugee status or humanitarian protection, which enabled them to work and receive social welfare benefits, according to the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees. The percentage was higher among applicants from Syria, amounting to about 97 percent of them. In contrast, ten years ago, less than seven percent of asylum applicants in Germany obtained refugee status.

More than half of the long-settled immigrants in Germany believe that the newcomers are getting too much. According to Riham Alkousaa this was confirmed by many members of the former Arab community that the German government in 2015 opened new horizons for refugees, horizons that immigrants had not seen before(21). Previously, immigrants on certain statuses were not allowed to work for up to three years and were often not entitled to social welfare benefits, and they had to bear the costs of learning the German language, unlike what is now offered to refugees for free.

Older Arab and Muslim immigrants complain that newcomers are “too liberal” According to DW(22). In 2009, more than 80 percent of Muslim immigrants from the Middle East considered themselves “very religious” or “really believers,” according to government data(23). Some of them have a stereotypical image of Syrian women or are surprised by the presence of gay men and women among the new arrivals. And the lack of strong religious commitment and the strong and large integration of the newcomers with German society and their behaviour, daily life and social relations such as bonding or nightlife in Berlin.

All of this is one of the most important difficulties that the Syrian society faces in Berlin in an indirect struggle to communicate with the former Arab community or other groups such as the Russians who came to Germany in the nineties of the last century after the collapse of the Soviet Union in Berlin, but the existence of all these difficulties reflected on the German government’s understanding of the mistakes it made in the past, and a law that took effect in 2005 sought to encourage this by organizing courses to teach foreigners the German language, history and culture. She believes that not providing relatively comfortable conditions for the newcomers is not a solution and that complicating the entry of newcomers to the labour market and not providing the appropriate support for integration will be a big mistake for the future.

A crisis of belonging and identity

The Syrian people, who are now mostly divided into several peoples, have lost the concept of a single people. There are people who support the Assad regime and people who oppose the Assad regime, and there are refugees and displaced persons… Each of these groups belongs to their own homeland, so some people who support the Assad regime have started to see the homeland as confined. In the areas under the control of the army, and some opponents of the Assad regime believe in their areas of control or what is known as the liberated areas. As for some refugees, they found their homeland in their countries of asylum in Europe and elsewhere, where they obtained a share of human rights and citizenship, while the homeland was narrowed for many victims of the war and the displaced to be limited to A house, a loaf of bread, and a measure of safety. Others shortened their homeland to their family, a few friends, or just a lover.

Today, this popular national division constitutes a clear threat to the sense of collective national belonging and to the possibilities of a future for a unified Syrian identity.

Perhaps the most prominent threat to the future of identity and belonging in Syria is the alienation of large components of its people from their motherland in favor of other countries. Many Syrians who left the country erased the idea of ​​returning to it or lost their sense of belonging to it. Giving up Syria is a survival for them, for their culture and humanity, while staying in the country, or going back, might turn them into murderers, criminals, or numbers waiting for a bullet or a shell, so it seems to them that those who remained in Syria chose suicide or a slow death. Others believe that this country is no longer theirs and that their presence in it will not change anything, as they cannot save it or find a solution that might end the war.

This reality of alienation is beginning to affect the shape of the Syrian identity and its diverse fabric, especially after the naturalization of Syrians abroad, as many of them began to lose the compass of their affiliation and the nature of their identity.

On the other hand, groups of those who are still at home have begun to feel betrayed, hopeless, and unable to play an effective national role, after their voice has been silenced, their movement paralyzed, and their strength weakened. Therefore, travelling outside the country’s hell has become a dream for most of them, and acquiescence and identification in meaninglessness are the only two possibilities for them. Another danger will stare at the issue of identity, especially since some of these groups began to feel hatred towards their country and hatred for it after it had destroyed, in his or her opinion, everything that they loved and belonged to and rejected even when he or she still lives in it.

On the other hand, many Syrians, who had an active national role, insist on staying in Syria and find steadfastness and resistance in the matter. Rather, for them it is a struggle and heroic stance, and they think that some of those who left were unpatriotic and defeated, and did not fulfill the role assigned to them towards their country that they could have even when they were outside of it. Rather, they unwillingly helped to destroy it and left, preferring their individual interests and projects over the interests of the revolution and the country, and they failed the Syrians who paid the bill of war and blood alone.

This conflict between Syrians inside and outside the country may constitute a major future obstacle to the consensus on forming a single Syrian identity, given the extent of the current disagreement and disagreement between the two parties on thorny and complex concepts and issues, such as the concept of patriotism or treason and alienation from the homeland.

Until today, most of those lining up with the Syrian regime have tried to limit national affiliation to loyalty to the symbols of this regime and the tools of its authority, and they propagated the form of the Syrian identity that served the regime, and stripped it from all those who did not follow their approach and their affiliation to Syria and tried to dwarf and punish them in various ways. On the other hand, some opposition forces also took arms with a certin compass of affiliation from the national affiliation of the Syrian revolution to religious and regional affiliations, they began to form factions with purely religious ideologies, and they sought to achieve individual and authoritarian gains instead of national gains, and thus all of these forces will affect the issue of identity and belonging, as they may drag the country into a partition or other Unexpected painful scenarios.

Despite the tragedy of the Syrians, their dispersion, divisions, and the rupture of their national feeling, there are large groups of them who remained loyal to the core national principles and adhered to their cultural, intellectual and civilizational affiliation to Syria as a homeland and an identity. And there are groups that presented wonderful examples of citizenship, acceptance of the other, rejecting sectarianism and confronting the ideas of war and its deductions. They also preserved the concept of coexistence and brotherhood by helping and sheltering the displaced and extending a helping hand to everything that is Syrian. Others maintained their identity, despite their departure from Syria, so they tried to spread their culture and authenticity to the world with the country’s culture, arts, civilization and history.

Syrians in Germany

Attempting to answer the question of this paper, one has to talk about Syrians in Germany and the process of integration at the social, professional and labor market levels. According to Amer Katbeh, 2020(24) integration that was supported by the German government with many programs. Many Syrians see that social integration begins with work, they also see it as the key to integration and gaining the respect of the others, and that the work helps them a lot to strengthen their German language and form a network of relationships with new societies and cultures and learn the customs and natures of other people present in Germany, and this also improves the image of the refugee within society by paying taxes like other citizens.

Germany has become a major European destination for Syrians. Between 2015 and 2016, around 431,300 Syrians applied for asylum in Germany, which constitutes 35% of all asylum applications registered in Germany.

The spatial distribution of Syrians in the German federal states shows a clear tendency to settle in West Germany. In 2019, almost 60% of Syrians were registered in the four German federal states, North Rhine-Westphalia, Lower Saxony, Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria(25). This geographical concentration can be traced back to the better economic and labor market situation in these federal states, as well as the historical presence of former immigrant groups, especially from Lebanon, Morocco, and Turkey.

Since 2015, with the arrival of thousands of refugees in Germany, the issue of asylum policies has featured prominently and consistently in the national political debate. This issue has changed the political landscape in Germany (such as the rise of the conservative Right-Alternative Party for Germany, AFD), and raised many social and political questions regarding the country’s future(26). The German government has also taken additional measures to support the integration of refugees in Germany, apart from basic humanitarian support. These measures relate not only to integration into the system (e.g. accommodation, language, work or study programmes, etc.), but also to social integration (e.g. community values ​​and standards, participation and social coexistence). In its recent strategy for integration, the German government viewed integration as a two-way process(27).

The German government offers integration courses such as German language courses and cultural orientation courses, which are mandatory for most foreigners.(28)The courses consist of a language course (600–900 hours of instruction and the number of hours can be increased in some cases) and an orientation course (60 hours) in which issues such as the German legal system, history and culture, rights and duties in Germany, ways of coexistence in society are addressed, important values ​​in German society.

Despite these measures, negative perceptions and understanding of the issue of integration have arisen among many Syrians during the past six years. This negative perception is mainly due to direct methods of education in which refugees are taught the concept of integration, and how “German” values ​​and norms should be understood, without providing space for an exchange of roles in the integration process. This has made many refugees not seriously interested in integration courses. They consider it just the official procedure that must be followed in order to obtain an integration certificate “Live in Germany”.

The integration process suffers from many challenges and difficulties that Syrians face in Germany, the most important of which is how Syrians view social integration in German society from their side and the challenges they face in finding a space for themselves within the culture of the host society, in addition to familiar issues related to basic needs, such as finding housing, finding suitable work or study opportunities, or enrolling children in school, which are more related to systems integration, difficulties in learning German which represents a major barrier to understanding the bureaucratic procedures surrounding asylum law and social assistance as well as communication.

Not speaking German contributes significantly to unequal relations between refugees and Germans, and to the different traditions, norms, and laws in Germany, due to differences in the social structure (individualism versus collective society), political system (federal parliamentary versus centralized presidential) and rule of law (dominant versus absentee). Compared with the country of origin (Syria), and the difficulties in obtaining clear information on the issue of rights and duties. Despite the availability of a wealth of information online in Arabic, it appears that many Syrian refugees still rely on informal sources (such as friends and/or social media) for information, and prejudices exist on both sides ( Germans and refugees) and the lack of means to overcome them.

All of this has contributed to the emergence of crises resulting from these challenges at the social level, such as the identity crisis and psychological problems, which also constitute a major obstacle to the process of integration or inclusion, as many Syrians prefer to call it.

Integration or isolation?

This is an existential question, it extends to all transitional societies, and it is useless to escape and hide under any lawsuit or name. Awareness of it works a lot to mitigate the negative effects of this temporal and spatial shift, and then can allow to consolidate practical visions and concepts that work hard to achieve the most difficult equation, which is belonging and their privacy with everything related to culture, religion, and traditions.

Undoubtedly, demonstrating the cultural and social characteristics of minorities is at the heart of the community’s work, but the essential remains is its tireless and continuous endeavour to dismantle the barriers and obstacles that obstruct the path of its members in integrating with their new reality.

These obstacles are represented in language barriers, lack of professional skills and educational abilities. This is the role assigned to it as an institutional framework that works in coordination with the bureaucratic apparatus to achieve the goal of positive integration. It is a complex role that requires qualitative leadership capabilities, rich practical experience and a fertile imagination in order to translate into effective and fruitful plans on the ground. Unfortunately, this has never been available through the historical process of the various organizations and the various names of the different Syrian entities, for many reasons, the most important of which is the conservative mentality, the weakness of qualitative capabilities, and the atrophy of imagination of those who faced this task before. In this case, they have strongly contributed to creating psychological and material barriers between themselves, and to the state and society as a whole, deepening the isolation and pushing people to retreat into themselves and seek to inflate themselves in a harmful compensatory endeavor. One is surprised to find that the problem of language barriers does not take any space or attention from the communities, while it is the magic key without which the new social reality cannot be unlocked, and then talking about achieving any amount of social advancement becomes a kind of waiting for miracles.

We do not need to say that all of this has created a lack of communication between the state and minorities, created a kind of mutual misunderstanding and reinforced the psychology of the ictimization, which our societies are now mastering and finding consolation in.

As I mentioned earlier, the ancient Syrian diaspora community finds itself linked to German society in a very large way, and this is due to various reasons, most importantly, the time period that the ancient Syrians lived in Germany, the feeling of belonging to Germany as German citizens of Syrian origin, integration into German society in terms of learning the language and a broad understanding of German society, their commercial and economic activities and German cultural integration.

Where integration in German society also plays an important role in the problem of the non-union of the Syrian diaspora communities through reasons closely related to the similar role of integration, which could represent a common ground for communication between the Syrian diaspora communities, the most important of which is, as indicated by both Samer and Amjad:

1. A personal-level reason, as the personal conditions of many newcomers and presented them as refugees to Germany are forced to be here, but to flee from military service and their close emotional and intellectual connection to what is happening now in Syria with the continuation of the conflict until today, and their responsibilities towards the families they left behind, and exposing them to many psychological problems, or the category of people of old ages who have difficulty learning the language and integrating at this age, also many individuals with non-academic backgrounds from professionals and craftsmen are added to them, many of whom also have to work urgently to be able to help their family in Syria was unable to participate in the integration courses or learn the language, and a group of newcomers were added to him who reject and deny the refugee status that was imposed on them and classified them socially in Germany.

2. The integration process, the great pressure to go to German language schools, has caused many newcomers to delay in finding the opportunity to start learning German in an organized manner or to learn the language correctly by qualified language teachers with academic backgrounds, the existence of an unclear policy towards refugees and the constant pressure by the extreme right and the failure to combat racism and stereotypes towards refugee backgrounds and religious affiliation caused many cases of fear, tension and instability on the part of many newcomers, which contributed to the existence of invisible borders between them and the integration process.

3. Exceptional situations, as a group of newcomers see that investing in language learning or cultural and social participation is not important to them, and these reasons are due to their strong attachment to Syria and their plans to return as soon as they get an opportunity.

The importance of the political and civic participation of the Syrian diaspora communities lies in their contribution to enabling relations with the state and German society, and giving diaspora communities the opportunity to find channels of communication with the state, and the space to represent diaspora societies in the political and governmental formation of the state. The Syrians were able to find a space for them within the German political corridors, all the way to the Bundestag hall, political parties and municipal councils. Here, I share more about the Syrians and their political participation in Germany from a personal conviction about the importance of this political participation in supporting and securing the unity of diaspora societies.

Syrians and political participation in Germany

During the end of last year, the streets of German cities, including Berlin, were filled with images of female candidates and candidates, and with the terms of political propaganda, which have become largely repetitive and devoid of innovation, as many people here believe. Everyone is trying to do everything possible to win the opinions of voters, and from among these voters, you find Arab voters, including an increasing number of Syrians who have succeeded in obtaining German citizenship. These are watching the various political programs of political parties, waiting for election day, most notably the Christian Democratic Party and its Christian Social partner, Social Democrats, Greens, Liberal Democrats and the right-wing party The populist who calls himself the “Alternative for Germany”.

Many observers here believe that the Arab electorate does not yet have an electoral weight that could make a slight change in the course of the electoral process, but this did not prevent some parties from going to them and giving them a special speech, to benefit from their votes in some areas or the constituencies in which they are concentrated, including Neukölln, for example. But what are the motives that push Germans of Arab descent to vote for one party only?(29)

The historically Arab residents of Germany who have witnessed many electoral processes in the past have a realistic understanding of the electoral programs launched by the parties here, so they often do not raise the ceiling of their expectations from it, especially with regard to foreign policy, and specifically the policy that touches on Arab issues. The politician draws general lines for its foreign policies, in order to leave itself a margin of wider movement in interpreting or practicing its international policy when it comes to power, and because it will find itself forced to conclude alliances with other parties that share power with it in order to be able to form a government. and accordingly; It is unlikely that you will find glaring discrepancies in the programs of the political parties at the external level, therefore, the foreign political agenda of the parties cannot be considered a clear reason for polarizing the Arab voice in Germany, the most that can be bet on here is the continuation of moderate positions towards the major issues of the Arabs, such as the issue of Palestine or the position on the Arab dictatorial regimes. There is nothing clearer than what the former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, whose reign was marked by the fall of the Berlin Wall and German unity, said when a journalist asked him what German interests are in the Middle East, and his answer was that “Germany has no policy in the Middle East, but interests.” Since then, it has become more and more clear that German interests are, above all, regulating the work of foreign policy. This is what has become closer to a pragmatic approach adopted by the German parties, with all their differences, in the foreign file.

For the Syrians, the programs of the Green Party or the Socialist Party are viewed with a very positive perspective, as their access to power would provide a more secure environment for them, in the sense of eliminating the fears of deportation that recently flared up, especially after the recent decisions that appeared in Denmark and opened the way for a wide debate about the return of Syrian refugees to Syria. The promises of more facilitation in procedures related to obtaining residence, family reunification and obtaining German citizenship, for the refugees, of whom the Syrians represent the largest bloc, are the most prominent points that would grant Syrian refugees a safe status in Germany. Of course, what was mentioned in the bipartisan platform about restricting or preventing the sale of German arms to dictatorial regimes, such as the Assad regime, can be seen as a positive factor that is viewed with relief.

Setting a higher rent ceiling is also one of the important issues for Syrian refugees who live in rented houses until today, as well as reducing taxes on low and middle income earners that the Green and Socialist parties emphasized, as well as what was stated in the Left Party program, on setting the minimum wage in 13 euros per hour, which is in the interests of Syrian refugees, a large part of whom are exploited, when they are employed according to the minimum wage, because of their need to work.

On the other hand, the program of the right-wing party targets refugees; He wants to return to border control and to put border fences on the borders to prevent the arrival of refugees. He also wants to prevent the decision to ban deportation and prevent refugee families from being reunited. Leaders from this party have previously visited the regime in Syria, in order to suggest that Syria is a safe country, with the aim of pressuring Syrian refugees to return.

Integration in the labor market is essential in getting out of the refugee or immigration classifications, but high labor market standards still prevent the completion of this integration process, for Syrians, and it is not known precisely the number of Syrians who got rid of refugee status to date, but it is certain that thehe consequences of the outbreak of the Corona virus have profoundly affected the labor market of refugees, and deprived thousands of Syrians who work in professions such as restaurants, cafes and hotels, of their jobs. In general, the electoral programs do not address this specificity, but they take into account the plans and programs for recovery from the effects of the Corona era in general in the country.

The considerations of the first generation of German Arabs, in their political alignment, have changed among their children from the second generation who are more likely to participate in political life in party life and its variations than the generation of their parents, and an increasing presence can be recorded for them, starting with left-wing parties to parties with liberal propositions. Watching a number of candidates of Arab origins on the party lists of various parties, indicates some kind of integration into party life. The new generation has motives to support one party over another, taking into account the generation of parents, but they are similar to the motives of their German peers, such as providing job opportunities, economic prosperity, social justice and adopting policies that certainly support immigrants. As for the Syrian refugees, the matter still depends on the first generation, as the new presence of refugees since 2015 is still in its early stages, but this does not prevent them from taking a position in support of parties only, such as the Green Party, whose electoral program included promises and ambitious plans related to immigrants.

The apparent enthusiasm among the refugees for the Green Party did not prevent them from taking a rational position on it, in terms of its foreign policy, as the statements of the Green Party leader (Cem Özdemir), following Trump’s decision to consider Jerusalem as the capital of Israel in 2017, in which he urged the refugees to show gratitude to Germany To stop participating in anti-Israel demonstrations is still fresh in the minds of the refugees.

The Social Democratic Party also has a broad base among Syrian refugees, and support for Ms. Merkel’s party, the Christian Democrats, which facilitated their arrival in the country years ago, cannot be ignored. One thing that makes them reluctant in expressing full support for it is that Ms. Merkel is out of political life. Moreover, there is no guarantee so far that her party or her successor will continue to follow her same policy during the coming period.

With the exception of the right-wing populist Alternative for Germany party that rejects refugees and foreigners in general, no German party has a negative agenda towards Syrian refugees. However, the parties that show a clear interest in refugees, as well as are consistent with their literature, take into account the changes in the electoral landscape in the coming years, with More Syrians will move — year after year — to the voter list, which it is hoped that they will have an electoral weight that can be paid attention to, and have a greater impact on the political life of Germany.

Conclusion

Growing a strong single Syrian community, after all that the Syrians have experienced during the past years, is not an easy thing at all and requires a lot of expertise, support ,and empowerment from the government, local institutions and the Syrians themselves, let alone the very important factor of time, where only what has passed so far almost 8 years after the arrival of the Syrian refugees in Berlin, they had to go through the process of learning integration and stability, learning the language and exchanging trust with the host community.

In addition to the concerns and responsibilities that link them directly to Syria and they need to reach a psychological comfort that will help them think or To depend in one way or another as a diaspora community and join the Syrian diaspora community located in Berlin, and many of the newcomers have proven their skills in learning the language and finding a suitable job or resuming their studies and overcoming the various daily difficulties related to the basic needs of communication, financial support or academic qualification, We cannot deny the magnitude of the various challenges in building a single Syrian diaspora society. These challenges were caused by the existence of an old diaspora society and a new diaspora society, and they constituted major obstacles towards the establishment of a Syrian diaspora community in Berlin, with many similarities in terms of culture, language or religion, but the presence of some important factors such as (identity conflict and belonging, length of residence and integration with the host society, individual successes and economic relations, challenges experienced by immigrants previously) It has contributed to the lack of common ground so far, but also the Syrians have gained a lot of political, economic and organizational experience and were able to build the former Syrian diaspora community and can do this again here in Berlin, the Syrians from the old Syrian diaspora community have been able to find a place for themselves in politics And the economy, business and many details within German society. And Berlin, with its incubator, characteristics and features, provides a very fertile environment for the reunification of the Syrian diaspora community. The existence of a single Syrian diaspora community is very necessary to support the Syrians in Syria, and also allows for effective economic participation in the reconstruction of Syria in the future, in addition to experiences at the level of state building and democracy and all that the Syrians learned from its political participation in Germany.

The newcomers of the Syrians need more time, experiences and attitudes that can help them understand the importance of the presence of the Syrian diaspora community here, that the Syrians need more care and initiative to build channels of communication with the old Syrian diaspora community so that they can dialogue and integrate with them in One diaspora community, the question here is when can the Syrians be ready to build a diaspora community together as immigrants and refugees?

The References

Interviews

While working on this paper, the necessary data was collected through Semi-structured interviews in Arabic via the Internet, they were recorded and then analyzed. The first interview was with Samer on Jan 2, 2022 and lasted for 29 minutes, the second interview was with Amjad on Feb 15, 2022 and It lasted for 49 minutes, during the interview a set of general questions were asked, and both Amjad and Samer shared their stories and linked them to the interview questions. I later analyzed the two interviews, and when writing the paper I benefited from the recording as well as the summary.

Reference:

1. In Nine Years, the Syrian Regime Has Dropped Nearly 82,000 Barrel Bombs, Killing 11,087 Civilians, Including 1,821 Children, 15 Apr 2021
2. The Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR), https://snhr.org/
3. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, https://www.syriahr.com/en/
4. UNHCR — Syria emergency / https://www.unhcr.org/syria-emergency.html
5. DeZIM Research Notes-Results of a Survey 2021
6. UNHCR Lebanon
7. UNHCR GERMANY FACT SHEET 2020
8. Bevölkerung und Erwerbstätigkeit Ausländische Bevölkerung Ergebnisse des
9. The Syrian Diaspora, Old and New, Bassma Kodmani
10. The Syrian Diaspora, Old and New, Bassma Kodmani
11. The Syrian Diaspora, Old and New, Bassma Kodmani
12. Migration Policy Centre (MPC)
13. ccording to the International Fund for Agricultural Development, Syrian refugees send remittances home, May 27, 2016. Available at: www.arabamerica.com
14. The Civil Society Support Room (CSSR), https://cssrweb.org/en/
15. Verband Deutsch-Syrischer Hilfsvereine, https://verband-dsh.de/
16. Amro Ali, On the Need to Shape the Arab Exile Body in Berlin, 25 January, 2019
17. Semi-structured interviews in Arabic online via videoconferencing
18. Riham Alkousaa, On Berlin’s ‘Arab Street,’ two worlds collide
19. dw.com
20. Semi-structured interviews in Arabic online via videoconferencing
21. Riham Alkousaa, On Berlin’s ‘Arab Street,’ two worlds collide
22. dw.com
23. Riham Alkousaa, On Berlin’s ‘Arab Street,’ two worlds collide
24. Social Integration of Syrian Refugees in Germany: Challenges and Approaches, Amer Katbeh, 2020
25. (Bevölkerung und Erwerbstätigkeit Ausländische Bevölkerung Ergebnisse des Ausländerzentralregisters 2019–100)(StBA_2019100)
26. The Economist’s special report, “The New Germans,” April 14, 2018
27. BMAS (Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales). 2019. Darstellung der Maßnahmen der Bundesregierung zur Sprachförderung und Integration.(accessed 2019.12.20)
28. §44a — Verpflichtung zur Teilnahme an einem Integrationskurs“ Aufenthaltsgesetz: Kapital 3 — Integration (§§43
29. Yahya Al-Aws, The Syrians in the political parties’ programs for the German elections,2021

Bibliography :

1. The Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR) / In Nine Years, the Syrian Regime Has Dropped Nearly 82,000 Barrel Bombs, Killing 11,087 Civilians, Including 1,821 Children / 15 Apr 2021
2. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights https://www.syriahr.com/en/
3. UNHCR — Syria emergency / https://www.unhcr.org/syria-emergency.html
4. DeZIM Research Notes-Results of a Survey 2021
5. UNHCR Lebanon
6. UNHCR GERMANY FACT SHEET 2020
7. Bevölkerung und Erwerbstätigkeit Ausländische Bevölkerung Ergebnisse des Ausländerzentralregisters 2017
8. The Syrian Diaspora, Old and New, Bassma Kodmani.
9. Migration Policy Centre (MPC)
10. According to the International Fund for Agricultural Development, Syrian refugees send remittances home, May 27, 2016. Available at: www.arabamerica.com
11. (Bevölkerung und Erwerbstätigkeit Ausländische Bevölkerung Ergebnisse des Ausländerzentralregisters 2017 -24)
12. (Bevölkerung und Erwerbstätigkeit Ausländische Bevölkerung Ergebnisse des Ausländerzentralregisters 2019–24)
13. (Bevölkerung und Erwerbstätigkeit Ausländische Bevölkerung Ergebnisse des Ausländerzentralregisters 2019–100)
14. The Economist’s special report, “The New Germans,” April 14, 2018.
15. BMAS (Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales). 2019. Darstellung der Maßnahmen der Bundesregierung zur Sprachförderung und Integration.(accessed 2019.12.20)
16. „§44a — Verpflichtung zur Teilnahme an einem Integrationskurs“ Aufenthaltsgesetz: Kapital 3 — Integration (§§43

Further Reading:

1. Amro Ali, On the Need to Shape the Arab Exile Body in Berlin, 25 January, 2019
2. Social Integration of Syrian Refugees in Germany: Challenges and Approaches, Amer Katbeh, 2020
3. Beyond Remittances: The Role of Diaspora in Poverty Reduction in their Countries of Origin A Scoping Study by the Migration Policy Institute for the Department of International Development July 2004
4. Mapping the Syrian diaspora in Germany,Contributions to peace, reconstruction and potentials for collaboration with German Development Cooperation 23January 2017,Nora Jasmin Ragab, Laura Rahmeier, Prof. Dr. Melissa Siegel.
5. https://www.unrefugees.org/news/syria-refugee-crisis-explained/
6. Gabriel Sheffer, Modern diasporas in international politics, London : Croom Helm, 1986.
7. Migration Policy Centre (MPC)
8. According to the International Fund for Agricultural Development, Syrian refugees send remittances home, May 27, 2016. Available at: www.arabamerica.com
9. UOSSOM is a coalition of humanitarian, non-governmental and medical organizations from the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Turkey. www.uossm.org
10. Eva Svoboda and Sara Pantuliano, International and local/diaspora actors in the Syria response. A diverging set of systems? March 2015, available at: https://cdn.odi.org/media/documents/9523.pdf
11. Kathleen Newland and Erin Patrick, Beyond Remittances: The Role of Diaspora in Poverty Reduction in their Countries of Origin, A Scoping Study by the Migration Policy Institute for the Department of International Development July 2004. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/Beyond_Remittances_0704.pdf / Hélène Pellerin and Beverley Mullings, The ‘Diaspora option’, migration and the changing political economy of development.
12. Peggy Levitt Social Remittances: Migration Driven Local-Level Forms of Cultural Diffusion, The International Migration Review, Vol. 32, №4 (Winter, 1998).Available at: https://is.muni.cz/el/1423/jaro2012/SAN202/um/SocialRemittances_MigrationDrivenLocal-LevelFormsofCulturalDiffusion.pdf
13. Kathleen Newland and Hiroyuki Hiroyuki, Mobilizing Diaspora Entrepreneurship for Development, Migration Policy Institute, 2010. Available at: https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/mobilizing-diaspora-entrepreneurship-development
14. Devesh Kapoor, Diasporas and Technology Transfer,Journal of Human Development, Vol. 2, №2, 2001, available at: https://casi.sas.upenn.edu/sites/default/files/bio/uploads/Diasporas_and_Technology_Transfer.pdf
15. Kingsley Aikin, The skill of the Irish,Alliance Magazine Diaspora Philanthropy, March 6, 2018 https://www.alliancemagazine.org/feature/the-skill-of-the-irish/
16. Conceptualizing Community, Albert Hunter. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-77416-9_1
17. Yahya Al-Aws, The Syrians in the political parties’ programs for the German elections,2021